At 06:14:11 h, at an aircraft altitude of 15 966 ft, the Captain contacted the company Operations Centre on the company radio frequency, 131.2 MHz. According to the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), at 06:12:38 h and at an aircraft altitude of 12 040 ft and climbing, the cabin altitude warning horn sounded.This was the last recorded communication between the flight crew and Nicosia ACC. At 06:11:45 h, flight HCY522 was cleared to climb to F元40 and to proceed direct to the RDS (Rodos) VOR. The Captain requested cruising level 340. At 06:11:35 h, Nicosia ACC identified the flight and asked for the requested final cruising level. At 06:11:21 h, the flight crew contacted Nicosia Area Control Centre (ACC) at reporting point LOSOS, climbing through flight level (FL) 100 for FL200. The aircraft took off from Larnaca airport at 06:07:13 h.Safety valve operates at 8.25 No leaks or abnormal noises (IAW MM 21 – 32 – 21 – 725 – 001)”. In response to the write-up in the Aircraft Technical Log, the Ground Engineer documented his actions as follows: “Door and local area inspected. He performed a visual inspection of the aft service door and he carried out a cabin pressurization leak check. Immediately after the arrival of the aircraft in Larnaca, the authorized company Ground Engineer (number one) went to the Boeing 737 aircraft for the required inspections.The write-up by the cabin crew was transferred to the Aircraft Technical Log by the flight crew as “Aft service door requires full inspection.” The cabin crew made an entry in the Aircraft Cabin Defect Log that “Aft service door (starboard) seal around door freezes & hard bangs are heard during flt ”. During the flight, the cabin crew noted a problem with the right aft service door.The aircraft landed at Larnaca at 01:25 h on 14 August 2005. On 13 August 2005, on the flight prior to the accident, the Helios Airways (the Operator) Boeing 737-300 aircraft, Cyprus registration 5B-DBY, departed London-Heathrow, United Kingdom for Larnaca, Cyprus at 21:00 h.When troubleshooting a pressurization problem, donning oxygen quickly will not only improve your mental capabilities, it can keep you in the game if things go south quickly or insidiously. In any case, if it isn't where it should be, level off and investigate. Even if it takes you ten minutes to get to 10,000 feet aircraft altitude, you should not see more than 3,000 feet cabin altitude at that point. You should know your normal cabin climb rate, typically around 300 fpm. You certainly should not be above that at 10,000 feet aircraft altitude. Most airplanes have a maximum cabin altitude between 6,000 and 8,000 feet. During every climb, part of your 10,000 foot check must be a check of cabin altitude.Oxygen supply and delivery equipment must be pre-flighted.Fuselage pressure leaks should be addressed immediately and repaired.Regardless of which version you believe - the romantic Hollywood tale or the cold facts of the accident report - there are several lessons we can take away from this mishap: Everyone eventually passed out, the aircraft ran out of gas, all aboard were killed.The captain misinterpreted it and continued to trouble shoot while continuing the climb and failing to don oxygen. The aircraft was designed with a warning horn that had two meanings: on the ground it meant takeoff configuration and in the air it meant high cabin altitude.The first officer, who had a history of SOP problems, failed to detect the improperly set switches.The mechanic didn't failed to properly apply the maintenance procedure that would have verified the pressurization leakage and failed to return the pressurization switch from its manual position to the automatic position.The airplane had a history of pressurization problems.It makes for good reading, but here is the abbreviated version: The report does note CRM issues and does a good job of figuring out what happened.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |